This document identifies the basic security threats that need to be addressed during the design of the NSIS protocol suite. Even if the base protocol is secure, certain extensions may cause problems when used in a particular environment.
This document cannot provide detailed threats for all possible NSIS Signaling Layer Protocols (NSLPs). QoS [QOS-NSLP], NAT/Firewall [NATFW-NSLP], and other NSLP documents need to provide a description of their trust models and a threat assessment for their specific application domain. This document aims to provide some help for the subsequent design of the NSIS protocol suite. Investigations of security threats in a specific architecture or context are outside the scope of this document.
We use the NSIS terms defined in [RFC3726] and in [RFC4080].
2. Communications Models
The NSIS suite of protocols is envisioned to support various signaling applications that need to install and/or manipulate state at nodes along the data flow path through the network. As such, the NSIS protocol suite involves the communication between different entities.
This section offers terminology for common communication models that are relevant to securing the NSIS protocol suite.
An abstract network topology with its administrative domains is shown in Figure 1, and in Figure 2 the relationship between NSIS entities along the path is shown. For illustrative reasons, only end-to-end NSIS signaling is depicted, yet it might be used in other variations as well. Signaling can start at any place and might terminate at any other place within the network. Depending on the trust relationship between NSIS entities and the traversed network parts, different security problems arise.
The notion of trust and trust relationship used in this document is informal and can best be captured by the definition provided in Section 1.1 of [RFC3756]. For completeness we include the definition